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284-1626. Fax: (305)284-2985. E-mail: oscar@mitnik.net.Managerial Power and CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms
Abstract
We study whether nancial distress aects managerial power and Chief Executive Ocers'
(CEOs) compensation in publicly traded non-nancial rms. Using a bias-corrected matching
estimator to identify suitable controls, we nd that both governance structure and CEO
compensation change when rms enter into nancial distress. CEOs are less likely to be the
board chairperson, and fewer executives sit on the board or on the compensation committee.
CEO compensation decreases considerably for both incumbents and successors, and the decrease
is driven by declines in stock-based pay. There are also fewer cases of opportunistic timing of
stock option awards.
JEL Classication: G30, J33, M52
Keywords: Managerial inuence, CEO compensation, nancial distress, lucky grants, bias-
corrected matching estimators1 Introduction
Executive pay in U.S. public companies has been rising steadily since the 1990s. The trend persisted
until the 2007-2009 recession, during which paychecks for top American executives rst shrank but
quickly resumed signicant growth afterwards (Costello, 2011). Several high-publicity controversies
around Wall Street pay packages in the middle of the nancial crisis have triggered public outrage
about executive compensation. In response, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act was passed into law in 2010. Among several other rules related to corporate
governance, the law provides shareholders with a say on executive pay with a non-binding vote on
executive compensation and golden parachutes, requires compensation committee independence,
and includes requirements that public companies set policies to take back executive compensation
based on inaccurate nancial statements (Zaunbrecher, Schweitzer and Hagler, 2010).
Implicit in these regulations is the view that a large fraction of CEO compensation reects
rent extraction by powerful CEOs and is thus deemed inecient (for supporting evidence see,
e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, and Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; for a review see, e.g.,
Weisbach, 2007). In contrast, a body of the executive pay literature posits that compensation,
equity-based compensation in particular, aligns managerial interests with shareholder interests
and thus ameliorates agency problems (see, e.g., the surveys by Murphy, 1999, and Core, Guay
and Larcker, 2003). Because many observed executive pay patterns appear inconsistent with the
predictions of standard optimal contracting models, researchers have conducted studies to extend
these standard models (see the survey by Edmans and Gabaix, 2009). Nevertheless, no consensus
view has emerged, and there is still much to learn about the determinants of CEO compensation.
This paper contributes to understanding the determinants of CEO pay by studying the dynamics
of the changes in managerial power and CEO compensation when public rms go through nancial
distress. We apply Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias-corrected matching estimator to nd the group
of suitable controls. This group consists of rms that are not only never nancially distressed but
also are, at least in a statistical sense, similar in observed characteristics to the nancially distressed
rms (i.e., the \treated") before they become distressed. Because pay practices and regulations
change over time, our use of control rms for constructing counterfactual outcomes (i.e., what the
outcomes would have been for the distressed companies if they had not been in nancial distress)
1lters out those changes and properly identies the eect of nancial distress. Specically, by
contrasting the comparable rms with those rms under nancial distress, we estimate the eects
of nancial distress on managerial inuence over the board, CEO compensation packages, and
opportunistic timing of option grants over the period from 1992 to 2005.1 Our study shows that
nancial distress curtails managerial power as measured by managerial inuence over the board,
reduces stock-based CEO pay (both for incumbent and successors), and decreases the occurrences
of opportunistic timing of stock option awards.
Our study is naturally linked to the literature on the relation between corporate governance
and rm performance. Both managerial power and executive compensation packages belong to
a broader set of corporate governance mechanisms. Many prior papers have concentrated on the
eects of governance on performance (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003; Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), without
paying particular attention to the case of distressed rms. We investigate the other direction
of this relation, i.e., the impact of rm performance on corporate governance, in the context of
nancial distress. It has been argued that falling into nancial distress can aect various aspects
of a rm's governance such as the realignment of duciary duties among stakeholders, shakeups in
the management team and/or the board, restructuring of management compensation, and changes
in ownership and corporate controls (see, e.g., the survey in Hotchkiss et al., 2008). Our empirical
strategy diers markedly from the majority of the studies in this literature because we construct
a control group. As shown in Sections 4 and 5, if we do not take into account the counterfactual
outcome provided by the control group, we would either overestimate or underestimate the eects
of nancial distress, depending on the particular outcome.
Corporate governance is a complex construct that involves many dimensions. Our analysis
focuses on a set of corporate governance variables that measure managerial inuence over the
board. The metrics include number of executives serving as board directors, number of executives
1As explained in Sections 2 and 3, we select the group of appropriate controls by matching rms in the same
calendar periods, on size and industry indicators, and on a rich set of rm characteristics measuring nancial health,
CEO compensation, and managerial inuence over the board three years prior to the advent of nancial distress. The
key assumption of this approach is that, for rms that have the same value of the matching variables, the event of
nancial distress is \as if" it had been random. This allows for answering the question: \how does nancial distress
aect a rm's corporate governance, CEO compensation, and opportunistic timing of stock option awards?" See
Section 3 and Appendix for further details.
2serving in the compensation committee of the board, whether the CEO serves as the board chair,
whether at least one executive serves as a board director, and whether at least one executive serves
in the compensation committee.2 We report a noticeable loss of managerial inuence over the board
among the treated rms after they enter into nancial distress. In particular, following the incidence
of nancial distress, the proportion of CEOs holding the chairmanship, and the proportion and the
number of executives serving as directors or sitting in the compensation committee of the board
all decrease signicantly.
Our paper also contributes to the under-studied empirical literature on executive compensation
for nancially distressed rms. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) examine executive compensation in
nancially distressed rms during the 1980s and nd that compensation becomes more sensitive
to performance after distress. Henderson (2007) analyzes a similar period to the one in our paper,
and concludes that compensation practices remain largely unchanged after nancial distress. Our
study diers from these two studies in two fundamental aspects. First, the two studies employ a
similar empirical strategy that compares executive pay before and after distress among nancially
distressed rms only, while we use a dierent strategy by contrasting the changes in executive pay
before and after distress for the treated rms with the changes for an appropriately chosen control
group. As discussed above, using controls is the only way to account for the impact of market-wide
shifts in compensation practices and to obtain a proper assessment of the eect of nancial distress
on executive compensation. Second, while the two prior studies focus on executive compensation,
our analysis also explores the dynamics of changes in both executive compensation and managerial
inuence over the board. Our study of this dynamics can potentially provide new insights into the
relationship between these two dimensions.
Our paper analyzes various components of CEO compensation such as total cash compensation,
stock grants, stock option grants, and total ow compensation. We document that CEO
turnover rates increase markedly in the distressed rms. Surviving CEOs experience signicant
reductions in total cash compensation and total ow compensation after the rms fall into nancial
2There are two other popular corporate governance measures in the literature, namely, Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick's (2003) G-index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell's (2009) E-index. These two indexes are only available
every two to three years and are quite persistent across years. As the overlap between the rms in our sample and
the rms for which those indexes have been calculated is quite low, it is not feasible to use those indexes in our
study. We face the same issue that there are very few treated rms for which the data is available for other corporate
governance measures such as board size, number of blockholders, and fraction of independent directors, etc.
3distress. Replacement CEOs at nancially distressed rms are also paid signicantly less than
their predecessors and than replacement CEOs at non-distressed rms. For both incumbent and
replacement CEOs, the bulk of their total compensation reduction derives from the decline in value
of new grants of stock options. In contrast, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) report that, when rms
fall into nancial distress, the reduction in cash-based compensation (salary and bonus) drives the
decline in executive compensation. This dierence between their nding and ours reects the shift
of executive compensation practices in the U.S. from bonus-based pay in the 1980s to stock-based
pay in the 1990s and beyond. Nevertheless, the bulk of our results are in line qualitatively with
Gilson and Vetsuypens' (1993) ndings. This evidence suggests that, even though the compensation
practices have changed signicantly over time, the eects of nancial distress on total executive
compensation are robust to dierent time periods under study.
Our paper also relates to the growing literature on managerial opportunistic timing of option
grants. For example, Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2006), and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) all
nd that rms' abnormal stock returns are negative before executive option grants and positive
afterward and attribute the stock return pattern to managerial backdating of option grants.
Collins, Gong, and Li (2009) report that weaker corporate governance contributes to the episode
of backdating executive stock option grants. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) examine the
ranking of a grant price in the distribution of stock prices during the month of the grant and show
that \lucky" grants, i.e., the options issued at or below the minimum observed stock price in the
grant month, provide a useful tool for studying such managerial behavior. Our paper contributes to
this literature by studying such managerial opportunistic behavior in rms under nancial distress.
We follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer's (2010) approach and focus on how grant prices rank
within the price distribution of the grant month. We nd that the proportion of lucky grants for
the treated rms is higher before falling into nancial distress and lower upon and after becoming
distressed, while the proportion of lucky grants for the controls remains fairly stable throughout the
same window under study. We also present evidence of the weakening of such managerial behavior
after the enacting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for both healthy and nancially distressed
rms, corroborating the ndings of Heron and Lie (2006).
In summary, we nd that the occurrence of nancial distress weakens managerial power, likely
4due to a greater scrutiny from stake-holders such as creditors and shareholders as well as from
the bankruptcy court judge if Chapter 11 protection is sought. While we observe diminishing
managerial inuence over the board in distressed rms, we also nd signicant declines in CEOs'
stock-based pay (for both incumbent and replacement CEOs) and in opportunistic timing of option
grants. Taken together, the results are suggestive of a link between managerial power and executive
compensation.
Two caveats are in order. First, it is very dicult to gather data once a rm goes into distress.
Most distressed companies stop making regular proxy and 10-K lings, and collecting executive
pay data from monthly 8-K lings or bankruptcy court dockets can be very dicult and time
consuming. Thus, any study in this area, including ours, has to deal with the challenge of working
with small samples.3 We face precision issues for some of our results, but in general, even with small
samples our main ndings are statistically signicant. Second, our compensation data is based on
the S&P 1500 sample of rms. Standard & Poor's, which collects the data, actively screens and
deletes distressed companies from the sample. As a result, the troubled rms we ultimately include
in our study may represent the least-distressed companies, potentially creating a survivorship bias.
Given that non-surviving rms likely experience larger declines in managerial power than surviving
rms, our ndings are probably conservative estimates of the eects of nancial distress.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the sample for our study.
Section 3 discusses details of the empirical strategy. Section 4 examines the dynamics of managerial
inuence over the board of directors before and after nancial distress. Section 5 presents the
eects of nancial distress on CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and opportunistic option timing
practices. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix explains the matching estimator.
3Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), and Henderson (2007) use samples of only 77 and 76 rms, respectively. Other
studies on dierent aspects of nancial distress face similar constraints. For example, Bernstein (2006), in a study
of CEO turnover in nancially distressed rms, compares 79 bankrupt rms to 1,288 rms \suering from poor
nancial circumstances", as determined by their three-year cumulative stock returns. As a comparison, we study 99
nancially distressed rms, and select our controls from a group of 1,205 non-distressed rms. Some recent studies
on the opportunistic timing of option grants face similar constraints as well; their samples typically range from 50 to
150 rms (see, e.g., Walker, 2007; and Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun, 2007).
52 Data and Sample Construction
Data for this study comes from several sources. We use executive compensation data from Standard
and Poor's (S&P) ExecuComp database. The database reports annual compensation ows as
well as information related to changes in the value of stock and stock option holdings for the
ve highest paid executives, including the CEO, for each rm appearing in the S&P500 Index,
S&P MidCap 400 Index, and the S&P SmallCap 600 Index. The database also contains some
information about these executives' positions in the board. Firms' annual accounting data comes
from S&P's Compustat database. We obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock File. We take bankruptcy ling information from Professor
Lynn LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD). Throughout our empirical analysis, we
measure all monetary values in 2005 constant dollars, and we adjust nominal stock returns by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to obtain real returns.
2.1 Variables
Three sets of variables are key to this empirical study. The rst set is the measure of nancial
distress with which we classify rms into nancially distressed or healthy. The nancially distressed
rms in our sample consist of two (in some cases overlapping) groups. One group is formed
by the rms that have led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and are covered in the BRD. The other
group of nancially distressed rms are identied based on a combination of the past three-year
cumulative stock returns and Ohlson's (1980) O-scores.4 Specically, at each year-end and from
the universe of all Compustat rms having non-missing information for both the O-scores and the
prior three-year stock returns, we rank rms into percentiles based separately on their O-scores
and three-year cumulative returns; we exclude nancial rms (SIC between 6000 and 6999) from
the rankings. We then classify rms as nancially distressed if the following two conditions are
satised simultaneously: their O-scores are in the top quintile of the O-score distribution and their
4To calculate the past three-year cumulative stock returns, we require at least 18 months of valid data within the
three-year period. Ohlson's (1980) O-score is a widely used measure for a rm's nancial status, and it is obtained
from a probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy with a set of nancial ratios including the logarithm value of total
assets, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, the ratio of working capital to total assets, the ratio of current
liabilities to current assets, the ratio of net income to total assets, the ratio of funds from operation to total liabilities,
the growth rate in net income, the dummy for total liabilities exceeding total assets, and the dummy for negative
net income for the last two years. Typically, the higher is the value of the O-score, the more likely is the rm to go
bankrupt.
6past three-year cumulative returns are in the bottom quintile of the cumulative return distribution.5
The second set of variables consists of the covariates we use to directly match distressed rms
with control rms. To identify the impact of nancial distress we resort to the Abadie and
Imbens' (2011) matching estimator. (See Section 3 for a detailed discussion of the estimator.) The
matching covariates include measures of a rm's nancial health, measures of CEO compensation,
measures of managerial inuence over the board, industry dummies, and year dummies. All
the matching covariates are evaluated three years prior to the occurrence of nancial distress.
Specically, to measure a rm's nancial health, we use the raw values of O-scores, the past three-
year cumulative stock returns, and rm size calculated as the log value of market capitalization.
We also dene three dummy variables based on the three raw measures to characterize the relative
position of a rm in the respective cross-sectional distributions: the O-score-based dummy is equal
to one if a rm's O-score is at or above the top quintile of all rms in Compustat, and zero otherwise;
the cumulative-return-based dummy is equal to one if a rm's past three-year cumulative return is
at or below the bottom quintile of all rms in Compustat, and zero otherwise; and the size-based
dummy is equal to one if a rm's market capitalization is at or above the top 30 percentile of
all rms in Compustat, and zero otherwise. Because the literature documents that leverage is an
important determinant of a rm's nancial status we include the debt-to-asset ratio. To achieve
good comparability between the rms in the treated and control groups, we also match on the level
and structure of CEO compensation packages; we thus include both total current compensation and
total direct compensation as matching covariates. We further match on three managerial inuence
measures because CEO power could aect both rm performance and CEO compensation practices.
The executives-on-compensation-committee dummy is equal to one if one of the top ve executives
sit on the board's compensation committee and zero otherwise. The executives-on-board dummy
is equal to one if one of the top ve executives serve as the board directors and zero otherwise. The
CEO-chair dummy is equal to one if the CEO is also the board's chairperson and zero otherwise.
Finally, to control for industry-wide dierences we adopt Fama and French's ve-industry denition
based on the four-digit SIC code and create ve industry dummies on which we also match, and
we use scal year dummies to control for business-cycle-related eects.
5We also identify nancially distressed rms with alternative combinations of those percentile cutos such as
the top decile on O-scores and the bottom decile on cumulative stock returns; the results under those alternative
classications are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
7The third set of key variables is comprised of three groups of outcome variables: managerial
inuence over the board of directors, CEO compensation, and opportunistic timing of option
grants. We defer the denitions of these outcome variables to Sections 4 and 5 when we discuss
the treatment eects of nancial distress.
2.2 Sample Construction
Our sample spans the period from 1992 to 2005. Moreover, because we are interested in the
evolution of outcome variables over time, we choose an analysis window spanning from two years
before distress through three years after distress, a total of six years. We include the two pre-distress
years to capture the cases where timing might be o if our denition of nancial distress does not
perfectly identify the timing of distress. Accordingly, we match the treated group to similar rms
based on the matching covariates in the year immediately prior to the analysis window, i.e, three
years before a rm becomes nancially distressed. As a result, our analysis focuses on the rms
that we identify as nancially distressed between 1995 and 2002.
The treatment in our study is dened as the \event" that a rm falls into nancial distress. We
use the term nancial distress broadly to include both bankruptcies and our measure of nancial
distress as described above. Most rms are in either of those two groups, but some qualify as
nancially distressed under both denitions. Because a rm can become nancially distressed
more than once over time, we restrict the treatment to be the rst time that a rm becomes
nancially distressed (by either denition). In only a few cases we include a second spell in distress
for the same rm, if at least seven years have passed since the end of the rst distress spell. In
order to maintain a clean potential pool of controls for the treated group, we drop from the pool
of potential controls any solvent rm which has ever been nancially distressed before.
Further, we apply the following two criteria to select rms into our analysis sample: 1) Firms
do not have missing information for either the matching covariates in the matching year (i.e, three
years before the treatment); and 2) rms have at most one missing variable in all compensation
variables in the pre-treatment window (i.e., from two years before treatment to the treatment year)
and at most one missing variable in all compensation variables in the post-treatment window (i.e.,
from one year after the treatment to three years after the treatment). As a result, our analysis
8sample contains 99 rms that were ever in nancial distress and 1,205 rms that have never been
in nancial distress during the 1995-2002 period.6
Table 1 breaks down the distribution of the treated group and the pool of potential controls of
the analysis sample across years. To avoid introducing serial correlation in the estimation of the
standard errors of our matching estimator, we assign each of the potential control rms to only one
particular year. We defer to Section 3.1 the detailed explanation of how we determine the year for
each potential control rm.
3 Empirical Strategy
We consider nancial distress as a treatment, and following the terminology of the program
evaluation literature, we construct a control group to estimate the eect of nancial distress. The
basic intuition is that the control group allows us to determine the counterfactual, i.e., what the
outcome variables of the distressed rms would have been if they had not suered nancial distress.
In a standard regression framework, all the rms that do not suer nancial distress form the control
group; however, as shown in the program evaluation literature, using such a control group could
lead to biased inference. An alternative way is to only select as controls those non-distressed rms
that are statistically similar to the treated rms in observable characteristics before the episode of
nancial distress.
In this paper we estimate the Average Treatment Eect for the Treated (ATT) of nancial
distress, using a matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). This estimator allows
matching directly on both continuous and discrete covariates and has several attractive features.
It is simple to use, it implements a correction for potential biases generated by non-exact matching
on (mostly) continuous variables, and it has well dened asymptotic variance.7 Most importantly,
it is well suited and has desirable properties, compared for example to matching on the propensity
6Although we nd 155 ExecuComp rms that le for Chapter 11 protection (i.e., covered in the BRD) in the 1995-
2002 period, only 43 of those rms have enough valid information to be included in our analysis sample. Moreover,
of those 43 rms, only 10 are classied as distressed based solely on their appearance in the BRD (i.e., because they
led for Chapter 11 protection).
7Being able to analytically calculate the asymptotic variance saves computing time with respect to estimating it by
bootstrapping. Moreover, Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrapping fails for matching estimators. Recently,
Abadie and Imbens (2009) have derived the large sample distribution of matching estimators, when matching on the
estimated propensity score.
9score (i.e., probability of treatment), in a case like the one under study | when the number of
treated observations is small relative to the number of control observations, estimating a propensity
score model with the usual logit or probit method can generate undesirable results.
Note that the key assumption for our econometric strategy to work is that, for rms that have the
same value of the matching variables, the advent of nancial distress is \as if" it had been a random
event. That is, matching on a rich enough set of variables is enough to identify the appropriate
counterfactual. In addition, as we discuss below, by relying on a dierence-in-dierences (DID)
version of our estimator, we can further control for any unobservable characteristics of the rms
that remain constant over time (e.g. \corporate culture"). This allows us to answer the question:
\for rms which went into nancial distress, what was the causal eect of nancial distress on
corporate governance, CEO compensation, and opportunistic timing of stock option awards?" The
remainder of this section and the Appendix provide further details.
3.1 Issues in Estimating the ATT of Financial Distress
One diculty in estimating the ATT of nancial distress is that although we have properly dened
the treated and control groups, i.e., the rms that ever go into nancial distress versus the rms
that never do in our analysis period, the timing of treatment (scal year in which the rm goes
into distress) is only properly dened for the treated rms. This is relevant because the standard
practice in estimating treatment eects is to dene as time t=0 the time of the treatment and
express all variables (both outcomes and covariates) with respect to time 0. The matching is
performed on covariates that are not aected by the treatment (i.e. before t=0) and possibly
include pre-treatment outcomes. The outcomes are the values of the post-treatment variables of
interest.
In our case though, it is not properly dened what t=0 means for non-distressed rms because
we observe most of the rms every year and in none of those years they go into nancial distress.
One solution to this problem would be to generate a dataset of \potential controls" in which any
rm with valid information is \recentered"at time t=0 every period and is potentially included
several times.8 For example, if rm XYZ appears in all the years from 1995 to 2002, then XYZ
8Because the matching estimator consists of selecting the best possible M matches (with replacement) per treated
rm, some of these rms may never be good enough matches to be actually used as controls in the matching estimator.
10would be included in the dataset eight times (once every year); and for each instance we could
center each particular scal year as time t=0. In this way XYZ would appear once in the dataset
where t=0 corresponds to the year 1995, t={1 to 1994 and t=+1 to 1996; and appear at another
time where t=0 corresponds to the year 1996, t={1 to 1995 and t=+1 to 1997; etc.
However, a problem with that solution is that it would incorrectly assume that each instance (in
dierent years) of the rm XYZ is independent of each other. The matching method deals eectively
with sampling with replacement within the same period but cannot deal with the potential serial
correlation introduced by the above exposed approach. To avoid that problem, we use each potential
control rm only once. This means that we use rm XYZ as a potential control by considering t=0,
say, either as 1995 or as 1996, but not both. One way to implement this restriction would be to
just randomly select the year for which rms will be potential controls; such randomization avoids
the serial correlation problem but might not use the available information eciently.
An alternative and much better way is to assign each of these non-distressed rms to the year
in which they could potentially be most useful. That is, we want to nd among all possible years
in which a non-distressed rm could be used as a control, the year in which the rm could be the
best possible match for a treated rm. To implement this idea, we essentially apply our matching
estimator twice. Specically, in the rst round, for each year we take all the nancially distressed
rms in that particular year, match them against all the non-distressed rms, and calculate the
Euclidean distance between each treated rm and each non-distressed rm. Then for each non-
distressed rm, we rank these distances across all possible years and pick out the treated rm
with which the particular non-distressed rm has the smallest distance. Thus, the year in which
that particular rm went into distress becomes the best possible year in which we can use the
non-distressed rm as a control, across all possible years in which it could have been used as a
control. Repeating this procedure for each non-distressed rm we essentially nd the year in which
each non-distressed rm could potentially be the best possible match for the treated, and we use
each non-distressed rm as potential control in that year only. This is how we assign the potential
controls to dierent years as presented in Table 1. Note that even in this situation all these chosen
non-distressed rms are still potential controls (i.e., some of the non-distressed rms will never be
This is why we call these rms \potential controls".
11used in the matching estimation). In the second round, given that we have assigned each non-
distressed rm to one and only one year, we pool together all the years and use the matching
estimator again to nd the best M matches for each treated rm in each year. We set the number
of matches to M = 4, which Abadie and Imbens' (2011) simulation analysis shows to minimize the
root of the mean squared error.9
Also note that t=0 could potentially refer to dierent calendar periods for the treated and the
controls in a matched pair. For example, a control rm in a \good" year for the overall market
could be matched with a treated rm which goes into distress in a \bad" year for the market. To
avoid this problem, we include the scal years of the treatment as matching covariates to force
that the comparisons of the treated rms and the control rms are done within the same calendar
period.
A second issue of importance is that our criteria for identifying a nancially distressed rm
includes the cumulative stock returns over the prior three years. It means that whenever we set time
t=0 for a treated rm, the determination of t=0 is actually based (partly) on the stock performance
not only in t=0, but also in t={1 and t={2. This potentially \contaminates" all the pre-treatment
variables in t={1 and t={2, suggesting that the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA),
which is needed for our estimator to be valid (see the Appendix), may not hold in t={1 and t={2.
The CIA implies that pre-treatment outcomes are not aected by the treatment. However, we
know that by construction at least stock returns in each of these two pre-treatment years are low
for rms going into distress at t=0. This can further aect other variables including those related
to CEO compensation. Therefore, we perform the matching on covariates measured at t={3, which
should not be aected by the determination of the treatment status.10
3.2 Assessment of Matching Quality
Before discussing empirical results we assess the quality of matching which is critical to the success
of properly identifying the treatment eect. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the matching
9In our estimations we also tried alternative values of M, from one to four, and the results are similar and are
available upon request.
10Also, note that for several of the compensation variables we observe outliers that could potentially aect the
results. We thus drop from our analysis, for estimation, the observations with the lowest and highest values for every
outcome variable, for the treated and the controls separately. Using dierent \trimming" rules, we obtain similar
results which are available upon request.
12covariates for the treated and the (potential) controls before and after the matching. As explained
above, matching is done at period t={3 (i.e. three years before nancial distress).
The rst panel of the table shows the mean and standard deviation of the matching covariates
for the 99 treated rms, while the second panel shows the same information for the pool of 1,205
potential control rms. The third panel calculates the average dierence and standard error in each
matching covariate between the treated group and the potential controls. It appears that the two
sets of rms are quite dierent in several matching covariates, particularly the year and industry
distribution, O-score and the past three-year cumulative stock return. Specically, relative to the
pool of potential controls, 8% more of the treated rms are concentrated in the scal year 1998 but
16% less of the treated rms are concentrated in the year 2001; 11% less of the treated rms belong
to the industry with SIC=2, but 12% more of the treated rms are in the industry with SIC=3; the
average O-scores of the treated rms are signicantly higher and 7% more of the treated are in the
top quintile of the O-score distribution. Interestingly, the average past three-year (i.e. from t={3
to t={5) cumulative returns of the treated rms (i.e. the rms that will be nancially distressed
in three years) exceed that of the potential controls by 24% and the gap is signicantly dierent
from zero.
The fourth panel of Table 2 shows the mean and standard error of the within-match dierences
in the covariates between the treated rms and the actually used controls when we apply the
matching estimator. Analyzing the within-match dierence allows us to evaluate the quality of the
matching and shows how the matching improves balancing of the covariates between the treated
and the controls. Note that, because we match each treated rm with four controls (M = 4), the
number of observations represents the number of within-match dierences used in the calculations
and, of course, equals the number of treated rms multiplied by four.
Clearly, once the matching procedure selects the best controls for the treated rms, the two
groups are much more similar to each other. The matching succeeds on almost all the dummy
variables. In particular, the year and industry classications are now balanced. The balancing of
covariates is very good for the continuous variables too, although not perfect. The dierence in the
O-scores between the two groups is cut in half, decreasing from 6% to 3%, but remains statistically
signicant after matching. The cumulative stock return shows the largest improvement, with the
13dierence between the treated and the actual controls dropping sharply from a signicant 24%
gap to a minimal and insignicant 4% gap. One exception is market capitalization in that the
dierence in rm size between the treated rms and the controls becomes signicant after the
matching. The dierence in rm size does decrease from 0.25 to 0.24 with the matching, but
the signicant reduction in the standard error of the dierence, shrinking from 0.15 before the
matching to 0.08 after the matching explains the increase in statistical signicance. This suggests
that rms that go into nancial distress are on average smaller than rms that do not, and we have
a hard time nding rms of equivalent size as controls. However, for our additional size measure,
the large-market-capitalization dummy, the dierence between the two groups is reduced and is
only marginally signicant. This evidence shows that the comparisons are mostly not being made
between small capitalization and large capitalization companies. Note also that the managerial
inuence measures are largely the same across the treated and the potential controls before and after
matching, although the proportion of executives sitting on the compensation committee increases
from 4% before matching to 7% after matching.
To sum up, the overall quality of the matching appears to be quite good and the matching works
well in balancing dierences in observed characteristics between the nancially distressed rms and
the comparable non-distressed rms. Note that we even match on the level and composition of
CEO compensation as well as the managerial inuence over the board at t={3, which implies that
the treated and the controls are similar not only in their characteristics and nancial situations but
also in their compensation policies and managerial power. Finally, we expect that any potential
bias that may remain due to non-exact matching in the covariates will be eliminated by the bias
adjustment step of our matching estimator.
3.3 Assessment of Identifying Assumptions and Timing of Financial Distress
For each outcome variable we estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) eect over
the period from two years before the rm goes into nancial distress (t={2) up to three years
after (t=+3). There are two reasons to include the pre-treatment years in the window of analysis.
On one hand, the event year (t=0), in which the rm goes into nancial distress, is determined
by us based on the rules explained in Section 2, so one may question the precision of the timing.
14By examining whether there is any treatment eect before t=0, we also implicitly check whether
the timing of our treatment variable is correct or not. Second, and more importantly, estimating
the ATT on pre-treatment outcomes provides an indirect test on the feasibility of the Conditional
Independence Assumption (CIA). The CIA is not testable, but as rst noted by Heckman and
Hotz (1989), one can estimate the treatment eect over a period during which there should be no
treatment eect and test whether that estimated eect is zero. If the hypothesis of zero treatment
eect is rejected, then it is much harder to argue that the CIA holds. Therefore, for the sake of
our study, we should expect the ATT on the pre-treatment outcomes to be zero.
Another concern regarding the CIA is that there might exist unobserved heterogeneity that
diers across the treated and the actual controls even after matching. The matching method
deals with dierences in observed covariates, and it is also possible to control for certain types
of unobserved heterogeneity. If the unobserved heterogeneity generates systematic dierences in
the outcome variables and the heterogeneity is xed over time (say, the rm's location, the type
of products the rm sells, the characteristics of the industry the rm belongs to, etc.), then we
subtract from each outcome variable the value of the same variable in a pre-treatment base year
so that this invariant unobserved heterogeneity is removed. This dierence-in-dierences (DID)
type of estimator may be more robust than the levels estimator because the DID method removes
any time-invariant heterogeneity not taken care of by the matching on observable characteristics
(Smith and Todd, 2005). Moreover, the DID estimator plays a role in eliminating any biases that
could be generated by dierences in (mostly) continuous matching covariates during the matching
period. As we show in the next two sections, in most cases we do not nd important qualitative
dierences between the results using the outcome variables in levels or in dierences.
4 Eects of Distress on Managerial Inuence Over the Board
It is widely believed that the occurrence of nancial distress weakens managerial power due
to increased scrutiny from stakeholders such as creditors and shareholders as well as from the
bankruptcy court judge if Chapter 11 protection is sought. There also exists an opposite view
that managerial inuence among the nancially distressed rms may strengthen because rm
stakeholders rely more on their managers' eorts to go through the process. Consistent with
15the latter view, it is a quite popular practice for distressed rms to grant generous retention plans
to certain executives and key employees during the process. We assess the eect of nancial distress
on managerial inuence over the rms' board of directors in this section.
Using the information available in the ExecuComp database we construct ve measures for
corporate governance. They are number of executives serving as board's directors (EXECDIR N),
number of executives listed in the compensation committee interlocks section of the rm's proxy
(INTERLOCK N), a CEO-chair dummy that equals one if the CEO also serves as the rm's
board chairperson and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR), an executive-director dummy that equals
one if at least one executive serves as a board director and zero otherwise (EXECDIR D), and
an interlock dummy that equals one if at least one executive serves in the compensation committee
and zero otherwise (INTERLOCK D). These measures are all related to whether insiders are
on the board and they jointly characterize potential inuence of management over the board of
directors and over the board's compensation committee. Higher values of these measures signal
that managers are more powerful and corporate governance is poorer. The compensation committee
measures, in particular, are clear indicators of potential inuence of the executives in setting their
own pay.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the ve measures for the treated and the potential
controls. Notably, for each of the ve variables, there are no signicant dierences between the
treated and the potential controls in the pre-treatment years or in the year of treatment (i.e., t = 0
or prior). However, in the post-treatment years (i.e., t > 0), the treated rms have lower values
than the potential controls in each of the ve measures, suggesting that the power of managers of
the treated rms diminishes after the rms fall into nancial distress. For example, in the pre-
treatment years, the proportions of CEOs that serve as board chairs for the treated group and the
potential controls are both about 0.6; in the post-treatment years, this proportion remains about
the same for the potential controls, but declines to about 0.4 for the treated, a drop of about 30%
with respect to the non-distressed rms. Similar patterns apply to executives serving as board
directors. The proportion of treated rms in which at least one executive serves in the board of
directors decreases from 0.96 before nancial distress to 0.88 after the onset of nancial distress,
while the same proportion remains at 0.95 for the potential controls throughout the analysis window.
16However, for the proportion of rms in which at least one executive sits in the board's compensation
committee, the pattern is decreasing for both treated and potential control rms (from around 0.15
to much lower values for both groups).
A careful inspection of the statistics in Table 3 highlights the advantage of using a control
group, versus an analysis that only looks at the measures before and after nancial distress, for
the distressed rms. A before-and-after analysis, analyzing the descriptive statistics for the treated
rms only, does not take into account the counterfactual (i.e., what the corporate governance
measures would have been under no distress). For example, from Table 3 we observe an overall
trend that the proportion of rms with executives in the compensation committee declines for all
rms, independently of nancial distress. A before-and-after analysis would attribute the fall in this
measure to nancial distress, thereby overestimating the eect of nancial distress, because it would
not take into account the overall changes in the non-distressed rms. The information on potential
controls as presented in Table 3, however, has one drawback | these rms may not be comparable
to those aected by nancial distress. This is why our empirical strategy relies on a matching
estimator to identify, among the potential controls, which rms are a proper comparison for the
nancially distressed rms. Below we discuss the results of applying such matching estimator.
Table 4 reports the matching estimate results both in levels (Panel A) and in dierences
(Panel B, setting t={3 as the base period), with robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Overall, the matching estimates for the treatment eects of nancial distress on managerial inuence
over the board conrm the patterns observed from the descriptive statistics.
We rst look at the results for the level estimates (Panel A). It is clear that in the pre-treatment
years the treated and the controls do not dier signicantly in term of their managerial inuence,
and the treatment eects on the ve measures are close to zero. However, in the post-treatment
years all the ve measures show signicant reductions and almost all the treatment eects are
signicantly negative. For example, in the year immediately after the distress, i.e, in t=+1, the
number of executives serving as board directors shrinks by 0.32, the number of executives sitting
in the board's compensation committee goes down by 0.13, the proportion of CEOs holding the
board's chairmanship decreases by 15 percentage points, and the proportions of executives sitting
in the board or in the board's compensation committee decrease by 7 and 8 percentage points,
17respectively. In other words, after entering into nancial distress fewer distressed rms allow their
managers to serve in the board or in the compensation committee, let alone as a board chairperson,
than their solvent counterparts.
The DID estimates in Panel B show similar patterns, although in general the treatment eects
are more imprecisely estimated. Even accounting for any dierences in the managerial inuence
measures between the treated and the controls in t={3, we still nd that the treatment eects are
negative and mostly signicant for the treated rms in the post-treatment years. Noticeably, in
neither Panel A nor Panel B, we nd any statistically signicant dierences in the ve managerial
inuence measures in the periods prior to nancial distress. This evidence is very reassuring because
it bodes well for the validity of the Conditional Independence Assumption. We return to this issue
below.
In summary, both the descriptive statistics and the matching estimators show clear evidence
of diminishing managerial inuence over the board among the nancially distressed rms. Less
executives serve in the board or in the compensation committee, and fewer CEOs hold the board
chairmanship after those rms fall into nancial distress. The evidence supports the conventional
wisdom that nancial distress causes rms and the boards of directors to reign in the CEO's and
other executives' power. Given the reduced managerial power due to the incidence of nancial
distress, it is natural to study whether the compensation and the status of CEOs change. Below
we investigate the impact of nancial distress on CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and one
particular form of CEO compensation practice | the opportunistic timing of stock option grants.
5 Eects of Distress on CEO Compensation, CEO Turnover, and
Opportunistic Timing of Option Grants
CEO compensation consists of several components. Total current compensation (TCC) is the sum
of salary and bonus. Total direct compensation (TDC1) is the sum of total current compensation,
the value of restricted stock grants (RSTGRNT), the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants
(BLKV ), and others, where the \others" item includes other annual short-term compensation,
payouts from long-term incentive plans, and all other long-term compensation. Besides TDC1, we
18use TDC2 as another measure of the total ow compensation to a CEO within one scal year,
which is the sum of TCC, RSTGRNT, value realized from option exercises (EXER), and others.
For equity-based compensation, we calculate two measures of CEO ownership: the stock ownership
excluding option grants (SHOWN), which is the total number of stock shares (options excluded)
held by a CEO scaled by the total number of rm shares outstanding, and the stock ownership
represented by option grants (OPGRNT), which is the total number of stock shares represented
by options granted to a CEO divided by the total number of rm shares outstanding.
Table 5 summarizes these CEO compensation components for the treatment and potential
controls groups. A few interesting patterns stand out. First, the level of the total ow compensation
TDC1 is mainly determined by the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants BLKV , while the
total current compensation TCC and the value of restricted stock grants RSTGRNT account for
a much smaller share of this total ow compensation. Second, both the Black-Scholes value of
stock option grants (BLKV ) and the value realized from options exercised (EXER) vary widely
over time; there are much smaller uctuations in bonus, the value of restricted stock grants, and
stock ownership through option grants; and the salary portion of compensation is quite stable,
consistent with the notion that it is more or less a xed pay. As a result, we can infer that the
time variations in TDC1 and, to some extent, TDC2 are mainly caused by the time variation s in
the two stock-option-related compensation components, BLKV and EXER, respectively.
We observe other interesting patterns by comparing the descriptive statistics of the treated
group with those of the potential controls. While BLKV of the treated group shows a generally
decreasing trend from the pre-treatment years to the post-treatment years, the potential controls
exhibit an opposite trend of increase over time; a similar pattern is followed by the compensation
measures TDC1, TDC2, and RSTGRNT. In addition, note that except for salary and stock
ownership through option grants, each of the compensation components for the treated group is
signicantly smaller than the corresponding compensation components for the potential controls in
almost all of the post-treatment years.
As discussed in Section 4, analyzing the descriptive statistics for only the treated rms is
akin to a before-and-after analysis of the eects of nancial distress, which is the backbone of
the analysis in Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993). This type of analysis not taking into account the
19counterfactual can lead to an overestimation or underestimation of the eects of nancial distress
on CEO compensation. Take TDC1 for example. Compensation measured by TDC1 is greatly
reduced for distressed rms from before to after distress. However, the descriptive statistics for
the potential controls suggest that there is an increasing market trend in TDC1. Therefore, the
before-and-after analysis not controlling for the market trend here would lead to underestimating
the eects of nancial distress on TDC1. Of course, as discussed above, we need to be careful in
making inference based on the potential control rms, which may not be comparable to the treated
rms. In the remainder of this section we concentrate our analysis on the results obtained from
using the matching estimator to select the appropriate control rms.
5.1 Eects of Distress on CEO Compensation for All Treated Firms
Table 6 presents the treatment eects on CEO compensation for all the treated rms using the
outcomes in levels (Panel A) and in dierences (Panel B, setting t={3 as the base period). Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The treatment eects identied using the outcomes
in levels or dierences do not dier much qualitatively. So, for brevity, we will concentrate the
discussion on the results in Panel B.
The rst thing to notice in Table 6 is that the treatment eects for the CEO compensation
components in the t={2 period are virtually zero with the only exceptions being EXER and
TDC2 (which is driven by the dierence in EXER). It shows that the compensation policies of
the treated and control groups are essentially the same up to two years before nancial distress,
although CEOs of soon-to-be distressed rms exercise more of their options owned. In the year
before distress (i.e., t={1), we see that some components of CEO compensation, namely, Bonus,
TCC, and RSTGRNT, become signicantly dierent between the treated and control groups,
which seems to indicate that the eects of nancial distress appear earlier than the advent of
the distress. We expect these types of results, in particular for t={1, given that our criteria for
determining the rst period of nancial distress is somewhat arbitrary. Overall, the evidence that
there are no signicant dierences between treated and controls in the pre-treatment years for the
majority of the CEO compensation components, suggests that we have done reasonably well in
dening the treatment status and the timing of nancial distress. Together with similar patterns
20we observed in Table 4 for the managerial inuence variables, our results bode well for the validity
of the Conditional Independence Assumption.11
Table 6 shows that the total cash compensation, TCC, of the distressed rms' CEOs decreases
after t=0 in the order of $400 thousands per year. This is a large eect in percentage terms
with respect to the total cash compensation in either the pre-treatment years or the treatment
year. Notably, the change in TCC is explained almost entirely by an increase in the gap in bonus
between the treated and control rms after the treatment year. Moreover, Table 6 clearly illustrates,
relative to the cash compensation, a much larger negative eect on stock-based compensation,
particularly the Black-Scholes value of option grants, BLKV . The value of BLKV drops by $2.4
million immediately in the distress year (t=0), and continues to decline by $4.9 million in the
rst year after distress (t=+1), followed by a reduction of $2.6 million in the second year after
distress (t=+2) and by a smaller, and statistically insignicant, decrease of $0.5 million in the
third year after nancial distress (t=+3). The value of stock grants, RSTGRNT, declines slightly
in the treatment year and the post-treatment period, but the magnitude is much smaller and the
treatment eect on RSTGRNT becomes trivial compared to the eect on BLKV . As a result,
the eect on the total ow compensation to CEOs, TDC1, is overwhelmingly driven by the eect
on BLKV . The value of TDC1 drops by $3.2 million immediately in the year of nancial distress
(t=0), and continues to decrease by $5.6 million in the rst year after distress (t=+1), followed by
a decline of $3.2 million in the second year after distress (t=+2) and a statistically insignicant
decline of $1.2 million in the third year after nancial distress (t=+3).
Table 6 also shows that the value realized from exercising options, EXER, decreases by about
$2 million per year after nancial distress. The treatment eect on EXER is not surprising as the
stock prices of the distressed rms decline signicantly after falling into nancial distress, thereby
reducing the value of previously-granted stock options. Consequently, the treatment eect on the
alternative measure of total ow compensation to CEOs, TDC2, which is driven by the negative
treatment eect on EXER, shows a similar pattern as EXER. Table 6 further evidences the
impact of nancial distress on the practices of option grants in that the stock ownership through
11As mentioned before, the CIA is not testable. Nevertheless, if we can show that the outcome variables in the
pre-treatment period are not statistically dierent across the treated and control groups, it is easier to claim that the
assumption holds.
21stock option grants increases in the post-treatment years. That is, the companies under nancial
distress appear to grant more options as CEO compensation in lieu of cash compensation, probably
because these rms lack cash/liquidity due to the distress.
In summary, the results show that nancial distress signicantly impacts the level and structure
of CEO compensation and that the most signicant eect is on the Black-Scholes value of new grants
of stock options, BLKV . As a consequence of a decrease in BLKV for the treated rms and an
increase in BLKV for the control rms, the eect of nancial distress on stock-based compensation
is large.
5.2 Eects of Financial Distress on CEO turnover
One way a rm deals with a CEO who has not performed as desired by the board (and the
shareholders) is to replace the CEO with a new one. Table 7 reports the average CEO turnover
rates in various subperiods for the treated and potential controls rms. It shows that the average
turnover rate is signicantly higher in the treated group than in the potential controls. For example,
in the [ 1;+1] subperiod the average CEO turnover rate is 52% for the treated group and 33%
for the potential controls. The average CEO turnover rates for the treated group increase to 63%
and 69% for the two subperiods [ 1;+2] and [ 1;+3], respectively. In contrast, the corresponding
CEO turnover rates for the potential controls are 41% and 48%, respectively. Clearly, for nancially
distressed rms, most of the CEO turnover occurs in the year of distress (time 0) and in the following
year (time +1).
Table 8 reports the treatment eects of nancial distress on CEO turnover using the bias-
corrected matching estimator (matching on the same covariates as in Table 2). In panel A, we
group the years before and after the time of nancial distress (t=0) in alternative windows. We
nd that turnover rates are signicantly higher for treated rms than for control rms. For example,
in the [ 1;+1] window, the CEO turnover rate is 19 percentage points higher for treated rms,
which is a very large eect taking into account that the CEO turnover rate for the control rms is
33%; if we extend the window by including t=+2 or t=+3, the CEO turnover rate further rises by
4 and 9 percentage points, respectively.
We also estimate the treatment eects on the CEO turnover rate on a year-by-year basis and
22report the results in Panel B. Like our results on compensation, there is no dierential eect on
CEO turnover in t={1, or t={2, or t=0. The single most important eect on CEO turnover
occurs in the year immediately after the treatment year (i.e., t=+1), when we observe a signicant
treatment eect of 21 percentage points. That is, the CEO turnover rate of the distressed rms is
21 percentage points higher than the turnover rate of the non-distressed rms after the rms fall
into distress. The treatment eect on CEO turnover is also present in t=+2 (6 percentage points)
and t=+3 (8 percentage points), although in a comparatively smaller magnitude than in t=+1.
The result on the increased CEO turnover rate mirrors our above evidence that managerial
inuences declines in nancially distressed rms. The more likely a CEO is to lose his job, the
less inuence he is to exert over the board. Also, to the extent that the estimator matches and
thus implicitly controls for the covariates characterizing industry and market performance, our
results can be interpreted as an estimator of relative performance. Two recent studies by Jenter
and Kanaan (2010) and Kaplan and Minton (2006) both show that CEO turnover rates have
increased substantially in periods roughly similar to the one we analyze. In particular, Jenter
and Kanaan (2010) explicitly study the eects of relative performance on the probability of CEO
turnover and nd that, contrary to the ndings of studies for earlier periods, CEOs are signicantly
more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and market performance. Like in the
two studies, we nd that rm performance has a very signicant impact on CEO turnover in our
sample.
5.3 Eects of Financial Distress on Compensation by CEO Turnover Status
Given the signicant treatment eect on CEO turnover, a reasonable concern is that the eects of
nancial distress on CEO compensation we document are driven or confounded by the eects on
CEO turnover. To separate the two treatment eects, we estimate the treatment eects of nancial
distress on CEO compensation for two subsamples. The rst subsample is comprised of all rms
that experience CEO turnover, and the second is comprised of rms that do not experience CEO
turnover.12
12We also conduct this analysis on the ve corporate governance measures discussed in Section 4. Even though
the results are somewhat imprecisely estimated (due to small sample size), we do not nd any qualitative dierence
between the two subsamples as compared to the results for the full sample. We do not report these results for space
considerations, but they are available upon request.
23A caveat is in order. Given that the year t=+1 is the rst and the single most important
period with a signicant dierence in CEO turnover rates between the treated and control rms,
we consider in the turnover subsample those rms that replace their CEOs only during the period
[ 1;+1]. This restriction guarantees that those rms do not replace their CEOs in the periods
t=+2 and t=+3, which yields a clear interpretation of the treatment eects of distress in those two
periods. It also allows for the comparison, in these two periods, with the results for the no-CEO-
turnover subsample. For the no-CEO-turnover subsample we select all rms that retain the same
(incumbent) CEOs over the entire [ 3;+3] period.13
Table 9 presents the results for each of the two subsamples using the DID specication of the
bias-corrected matching estimator. Panel A shows the treatment eects on CEO compensation for
the no-turnover rms, which are very similar to the ones estimated for all the rms in Table 6. Not
surprisingly, the salary, bonus, and total cash compensation of incumbent CEOs are signicantly
lower in and after the distress year; the most signicant and dominant eect is on stock-based
compensation, particularly the Black-Scholes value of option grants. Like in the full sample, the
treatment eect on the total ow compensation to incumbent CEOs is overwhelmingly driven by
the treatment eect on the Black-Scholes value of option grants BLKV . On the other hand, rms
under nancial distress tend to grant their CEOs more stock options in the post-treatment years,
as evidenced by the small but statistically signicant treatment eects on OPGRNT.
Table 9, Panel B reports the treatment eects on CEO compensation for the rms that
experience CEO turnover in the period from  1 to +1. Financial distress appears to have a smaller
and oftentimes insignicant eect on the new CEO's salary, bonus and total cash compensation.
This suggests that the distressed rms award their new CEOs cash compensation similar to that
received by the new CEOs of non-distressed rms. Interestingly, the new CEOs of distressed rms
do not seem to be paid market-value (i.e. the same as the new CEOs of non-distressed rms), in
terms of stock-based compensation. For the new CEOs who replace the CEOs of distressed rms,
the treatment eects of distress on BLKV , and thus on TDC1, are signicantly negative.
The results for the turnover and the non-turnover subsamples imply that CEOs of distressed
rms, regardless of whether they are incumbents or successors, suer large reductions in their
13For robustness, we try alternative ways of forming turnover versus no-turnover subsamples using dierent
windows. The results are similar and are available upon request.
24compensation after the rms fall into nancial distress and that this reduction derives mainly from
the drop in the value of their stock option grants. This is similar to the patterns we observe in our
analysis of the full sample. Consequently, we conclude that the treatment eect on the stock-based
compensation is not dominated by the treatment eect on CEO turnover.
It is interesting to document that the new CEOs of distressed rms that experience CEO
turnover are paid signicantly less, in terms of stock compensation, compared both to their
predecessors and to the CEOs of control rms. Noticeably, we also observe that the new CEO's
power as measured by their inuence over the board reduces relative to their predecessors and to
the CEOs of control rms. One might argue that paying less to CEOs of poorly-performing rms is
consistent with the use of benchmarking, or relative performance evaluation, by boards of directors
when setting CEO compensation. However, it is hard, a priori, to argue that new CEOs should
be penalized for poor performance resulting from their predecessors' tenure. Moreover, when we
analyze one potential \benchmark", i.e., the performance of the rm's stock prices after a new
CEO takes over, we nd that in years t=+2 and t=+3 distressed rms outperform control rms
(conditioning only on rms that replaced their CEOs in the [ 1;+1] period). Specically, in results
we do not present in tables for brevity, and using period t=+1 as a reference point, we nd that
stock prices for the treated rms increase by 32% and 38% more than those for the control rms
in periods t=+2 and t=+3, respectively. Thus, at least in terms of stock price changes, new CEOs
of the treated rms seem to be performing well relative to the benchmark, which makes it even
harder to argue that nancially distressed rms use benchmarking in setting CEO compensation.14
5.4 Eects of Distress on Opportunistic Timing of Option Grants
In this subsection we proceed to study the impact of nancial distress on the opportunistic timing
of option grants. Collins, Gong, and Li (2009) nd that weak corporate governance mechanism
is a contributing factor to the occurrence of option backdating. Our analysis in Section 4 shows
14An alternative explanation for the lower equity-based compensation for new CEOs of distressed rms, is that they
are just of \worse quality" than the new CEOs of non-distressed rms. It is not easy to nd good measures of quality,
and we analyze two characteristics that we believe could be good proxies. First, we look at the percentage of new
CEOs that have prior experience as CEOs (i.e., having appeared as CEO of another rm in the ExecuComp dataset)
or at least some prior executive experience (i.e., having appeared as one of the top ve executives in another rm in
the ExecuComp dataset). Second, we study internal promotions, i.e. new CEOs that have appeared as executives in
the same rm before becoming CEOs. With either measure of quality, we do not observe any signicant dierence
between the treated and the potential control rms. These additional results are available upon request.
25that, following nancial distress, managerial inuence over the board decreases. To the extent that
managerial inuence proxies for corporate governance, we expect that option backdating practices
should reduce after a rm falls into nancial distress.
We follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2010) and measure this opportunistic timing by
identifying \lucky" grants, that is, the options that are given at or below the lowest stock price
of the grant month. We set the grant price, if unavailable, to the closing price of the underlying
stock on the same grant day because the common practice of option grants is to issue them at-the-
money. We construct two such measures based on unscheduled option grants.15 We calculate the
raw measure as the average proportion, weighted by the size of each option grant, of unscheduled
grants that are lucky grants in a scal year. The net measure subtracts from the raw measure
the average proportion of trading days in which the stock price is at the lowest stock price of the
grant month. The net measure takes into account the fact that the prices of a nancially distressed
stock might be stale, meaning that there are few trades of such distressed stocks in the market.
Finally, Heron and Lie (2006) report that the abnormal stock return pattern consistent with option
backdating behavior has been much weaker after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).
The regulation, which requires option grants to be reported within two business days of granting,
took eect on August 29, 2002. To isolate the treatment eect of nancial distress from the eect
of the SOX regulation, we focus on the pre-SOX period.16
Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics of the two measures of lucky grants for the treated and
the potential control rms, both before and after SOX. For all the rms entering into distress in 1999
and after, period t=+3 occurs after SOX. In the same way, for rms experiencing distress in 2000
and after, period t=+2 also takes place after SOX, and so on. This explains why, in the before-SOX
portion of the table, the number of observations (both for treated and potential controls) decreases
monotonically starting from period t=0. It also explains why the number of observations increases
over time in the after-SOX portion of the table. Note that we only show periods t=+2 and t=+3
15Focusing on unscheduled grants is the standard approach to studying managerial opportunistic timing behavior,
but this restriction might make the evidence presented in this section not perfectly compatible with the evidence
documented in Section 5.1. The Black-Scholes value of option grants reported in the ExecuComp database includes
both scheduled and unscheduled grants. Unfortunately, the data does not contain sucient information to calculate
the Black-Scholes value for unscheduled grants only.
16We nd similar pattern of lucky grants if we do not exclude the post-SOX period from our sample. The results
are available upon request.
26after SOX, because sample sizes are just too small prior to t=+2. Unfortunately, these issues have
consequences on the power of all the analyses we conduct in this subsection.
We rst analyze the before-SOX statistics based on the raw proportion of lucky grants as
reported in the left half of Table 10. Several patterns are worth mentioning. First, the proportions
in t={3 and t={2 are slightly higher for the distressed rms than for the control rms. Second, the
proportions of lucky grants for the controls are quite stable during the period from t={1 to t=+3,
uctuating around 0.12. This evidence is consistent with Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer's (2010)
estimate of the percentage of lucky grants from 1996 to 2005. Third, the proportion of lucky grants
for the nancially distressed rms drops noticeably from over 0.15 before t={1 to below 0.10 and
even to 0.05 afterwards.17 Taken together, these patterns show clearly that the proportions of lucky
grants are higher for the treated than for the controls prior to nancial distress and become lower
from t={1 onwards. If we take into account the eective trading of stocks and analyze the net
measure of the proportion of lucky grants, the above patterns become stronger. As shown in the
right half of Table 10, the proportion of lucky grants for the distressed rms exceeds the proportion
for the controls by at least two percentage points in either t={3 or t={2, but the proportion for the
treated is at least two percentage points lower than the proportion for the controls starting from
t={1 and up to t=+3.
Table 10 also reports the descriptive statistics of the two measures of opportunistic timing of
option grants in the post-SOX period, for t=+2 and t=+3. Interestingly, the raw proportions of
lucky grants among the controls in t=+2 and t=+3 drop signicantly to 0.05 and 0.09, respectively.
Similarly, the net proportions decline to 0.01 and 0.05. In contrast, the raw proportions for the
controls in the pre-SOX period are 0.11 and 0.12 (0.07 and 0.08 for the net proportion) at t=+2
and t=+3, respectively. This result suggests that the SOX regulations have curtailed opportunistic
timing of option grants for all rms, and is consistent with the ndings by Heron and Lie (2006).
Table 11 reports the results from applying the matching estimators to the measures of lucky
grants in the pre-SOX period, both in levels (Panel A) and in dierences (Panel B). We rst look at
the results for the level estimates. Although many of the estimates are not statistically dierent from
17Note that, as explained in footnote 15, the calculation of the Black-Scholes value of option grants includes both
scheduled and unscheduled grants, while the analysis of lucky grants is based only on unscheduled grants. This may
explain why the proportion of lucky grants starts decreasing in t={1 and the Black-Scholes value of option grants
starts decreasing in t=0.
27zero, the level results exhibit a pattern similar to the one obtained from the descriptive statistics.
Using either the raw measure or the net measure, the estimated treatment eect on the proportion
of lucky grants is positive in t={2, suggesting that before distress, treated rms tend to award their
CEOs more lucky grants than the control rms. However, the treatment eects become negative
starting at t={1 and remain negative through t=+3, indicating that the treated rms signicantly
cut back the lucky grants to their CEOs. Panel B presents the results for the DID estimates,
with the dierence taken relative to the proportion of lucky grants in t={3. Compared to the
level estimates, the DID estimates display a largely similar pattern, although with lower statistical
signicance. As discussed above, the overall lack of precision in this part of our analysis is driven
by the relatively smaller sample sizes we work with when analyzing the pre-SOX period.
In summary, both the descriptive statistics and the matching estimators show some evidence
that there is a change in the behavior of awarding lucky grants to CEOs of rms under nancial
distress before and after falling into distress. The soon-to-be insolvent rms tend to award their
CEOs more lucky grants than comparable solvent rms two years prior to insolvency, but those
rms signicantly scale down the lucky grants to their CEOs after they become nancially distressed
while the comparable solvent rms maintain about the same level of lucky option grants.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the dynamics of the changes in managerial power and CEO compensation
when rms go through nancial distress. We use a bias-corrected matching estimator to nd
appropriate comparable rms to those in nancial distress and to estimate the eects of nancial
distress on managerial inuence over the board, CEO compensation, and opportunistic timing of
option grants. We nd that nancial distress has important consequences on corporate governance,
decreasing managerial inuence over the board in particular. Among distressed rms, there is a
signicant decrease in the proportion of CEOs holding the board chairmanship, and in the frequency
of executives serving as directors or in the compensation committee of the board. The CEOs of
distressed rms experience signicant reductions in total compensation, the bulk of which derives
from the decline in value of new grants of stock options. These results hold not only for incumbent
CEOs but also for replacement CEOs. We also show that periods of nancial distress are associated
28with a decrease in opportunistic timing behavior of stock option awards.
Our ndings are subject to caveats related to the nature of the data we rely on, but they
represent three separate pieces of evidence which point in the same direction. Taken together, the
results are suggestive of a link between the changes in managerial inuence and the changes in CEO
compensation (including the changes in opportunistic option timing). The occurrence of nancial
distress weakens managerial power, likely due to greater scrutiny from other stake-holders like banks
or courts. The reduction in managerial inuence occurs concurrently when executive compensation
in nancially distressed rms shrinks. The simultaneous declines in CEOs' stock-based pay (both
for incumbents and replacement CEOs) and in opportunistic timing of option grants lend support
to an interpretation that managerial power aects CEO pay.
We interpret our results as consistent with the view that executive pay reects a certain degree
of rent extraction due to managerial power. However, we do not regard them as evidence that the
optimal contracting view is necessarily irrelevant to the pay setting process. It could be the case
that nancial distress triggers a restructuring of executive compensation due to both the optimal
contracting mechanism and the managerial power reduction. Empirically it is very dicult to
completely disentangle the managerial-power eect from the incentive-pay eect, and we believe
that the pay-setting process includes elements associated with both optimal contracting and rent
extraction. Nevertheless, our results imply that incorporating managerial rent-extraction motives
more explicitly into theoretical models might improve our understanding of the determinants of
executive compensation.
29Appendix: Matching Estimator
Following the usual notation in the program evaluation literature, let Yi(0) and Yi(1) denote
the potential outcomes of unit i under control and treatment status respectively, for i = 1;::;N.
For each unit i we observe the treatment received Ti for Ti 2 f0;1g and the outcome for each
treatment, Yi = Yi(0) if Ti = 0 and Yi = Yi(1) if Ti = 1, as well as a vector of pre-treatment
variables or covariates Xi. There are N0 control units and N1 treated units, N = N0 +N1. We are
interested in estimating the Average Treatment Eect for the Treated (ATT)
t = E[Yi(1)   Yi(0)jTi = 1]:
The main identifying assumption necessary to estimate the above ATT is known as
unconfoundedness or the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). It assumes that
(Yi(1);Yi(0)) ? TijXi: This implies that after controlling for observable characteristics the potential
outcomes are independent of the treatment status. Actually, following Abadie and Imbens (2006,
2011) only a weaker version of the CIA is needed for estimating the ATT by matching; we only
need Yi(0) ? TijXi, that is, Ti is independent of Yi(0) conditional on Xi.18 The intuition is that,
after we control for all potential confounders Xi we can assume that the treatment is as good as a
randomized treatment.
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) consider the case of matching with replacement, allowing each
unit to be used as a match more than once. This procedure has the advantage of improving the
average match quality with respect to the case of matching without replacement, but implies that
special attention must be paid to the number of times a unit is used as a match. Following Abadie
and Imbens' (2006) notation, let jm(i) be the index of the m-th match to unit i (i.e. jm(i) is the
m-th closest unit to unit i in terms of the covariate values, measured by the Euclidean distance
between the two vectors). Let JM(i) = fji(1);:::;jM(i)g denote the set of indices for the rst M
matches for unit i, and let KM(i) denote the number of times unit i is used as a match if M
matches are done per unit, KM(i) = N
l=11fi 2 JM(l)g, where 1fg is the indicator function. Now,
18In addition to the CIA, we need to satisfy an overlap condition and other regularity conditions. See Abadie and
Imbens (2006, 2011) for details.
30for i = 1;:::;N dene the imputed potential outcome under the control status as
^ Yi(0) =






Yj if Ti = 1:
Then, Abadie and Imbens (2006) write the matching estimator for the ATT that uses M




















This is called the simple matching estimator. Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that this estimator
is not N1=2-consistent in general, because it includes a conditional bias term that may be of order
larger than N 1=2, unless the matching variables include at most one continuous variable. An
attractive property of this estimator is that the estimator for the asymptotic variance proposed by
Abadie and Imbens does not rely on bootstrapping (contrary to other matching methods).
Abadie and Imbens (2011) propose a bias-corrected matching estimator where the dierence
within the matches is regression-adjusted for the dierence in covariate values:
~ Yi(0) =






(Yj + ^ 0(Xi)   ^ 0(Xj) if Ti = 1:
where ^ 0 is a consistent estimator of 0 = E[Y (t)jX = x]. The bias-corrected matching estimator








(Yi   ~ Yi(0)):
Contrary to the simple matching estimator, Abadie and Imbens (2011) show that this bias-
corrected matching estimator is N1=2-consistent and asymptotically normal. In this paper we use
the bias-corrected matching estimator, in light of the desirable properties described by Abadie and
Imbens (2011). We carry out our estimation using the Stata command nnmatch which is discussed
in details in Abadie et al. (2004).
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33Table 1. Number of Observations for the Treated and Potential Controls across Years
Fiscal










This table reports the number of observations for the treated (i.e., financially distressed firms) and
potential controls (i.e., non-distressed firms) for each fiscal year. We require a firm included in the
analysis sample to have no missing information in the matching covariates in period –3, and at most
one missing variable among all compensation variables in periods –2 to 0 and at most one missing
variable in all compensation variables in periods +1 to +3. The benchmark period 0 refers to the year
when a firm falls into financial distress. The matching covariates are summarized in Table 2.
Analysis sampleTable 2. Balancing of Matching Covariates
Variable Within Matches Difference
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Fiscal Year 1995 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Fiscal Year 1996 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 1997 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 1998 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.25 0.08* 0.04 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 1999 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
Fiscal Year 2000 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 2001 0.15 0.36 0.31 0.46 -0.16** 0.04 0.00 0.01
Fiscal Year 2002 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.02
Dummy SIC = 1 - Consumer Industries/Services 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01
Dummy SIC = 2 - Manufacturing, Energy & Utilities 0.23 0.42 0.34 0.47 -0.11* 0.04 0.00 0.01
Dummy SIC = 3 - Business Equipment, Telecomm, TV 0.34 0.48 0.22 0.41 0.12* 0.05 0.02 0.02
Dummy SIC = 4 - Healthcare, Medical Equp & Drugs 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
Dummy SIC = 5 - Other Industries 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
Log of Market Capitalization 6.99 1.39 7.24 1.44 -0.25 0.15 -0.24** 0.08
Dummy Large Market Cap (70th percentile) 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.48 -0.08 0.05 -0.06* 0.03
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 0.48 0.24 0.49 0.19 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01
O-Score 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.06** 0.02 0.03** 0.01
Cumulative Stock Return over [–3, –5] 0.48 1.07 0.24 0.51 0.24* 0.11 0.04 0.02
Dummy Top Quintile O-Score Distribution 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.15 0.07* 0.03 0.00 0.00
Dummy Bottom Quintile Cum Stock Return Distribution 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Total Current Compensation (TCC) 1.01 1.07 1.09 0.76 -0.08 0.11 -0.06 0.05
Total Direct Compensation 1 (TDC1) 3.56 6.47 2.75 3.28 0.81 0.66 0.40 0.33
Dummy Executve(s) in the Compensation Committee 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.35 0.04 0.04 0.07** 0.02
Dummy Some Executve(s) Serve as Director(s) 0.96 0.20 0.94 0.23 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Dummy CEO also Serves as the Board's Chair 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.03
Number of Observations
This table shows balancing of thematching covariates in period –3, where the benchmark period 0 refers to theyear when a firm falls into financial distress. Column 1 lists
the matching covariates including year and industry dummies, firm size measured by the log value of market capitalization, size dummy that equals one if size is in the top
30 percentile and zero otherwise, leverage measured by debt-to-asset ratio, Olson’s (1980) O-score, past three-year cumulative stock returns, O-score dummy that equals
one if O-score is in the top 20 percentile and zero otherwise, return dummy that equals one if cumulative return is in the bottom 20 percentile and zero otherwise, total
current compensation (TCC), total direct compensation (TDC1), and three dummies measure managerial influence in the board. Columns 2 and 3 respectively summarize
the covariates for the treated and the potential controls. Column 4 presents the raw difference in the covariates between the treated and potential controls, and Column 5
reports the within matches difference in the covariates between the treated and actual controls. To identify the actual controls, we apply Abadie and Imbens' (2011)
matching estimator, setting the number of matches per treated firm to four. * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
99 1,205 396
Treated Potential Controls Raw Difference
!Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Managerial Influence over Board of Directors
Variable Period
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
–3 1.82 0.98 99 1.87 1.07 1,205
EXECDIR_N =  –2 1.83 1.00 99 1.86 1.04 1,205
No. of exeutives –1 1.80 0.90 99 1.82 1.01 1,205
that serve as    0 1.75 0.91 99 1.77 1.02 1,203
directors +1 1.39 0.83 99 1.68 1.00 1,204
+2 1.32 0.87 98 1.58 0.96 1,204
+3 1.28 0.87 96 1.51 0.93 1,077
–3 0.27 0.73 99 0.19 0.56 1,205
INTERLOCK_N = –2 0.22 0.62 99 0.20 0.55 1,205
No. of exeutives –1 0.21 0.61 99 0.17 0.53 1,205
that serve in the   0 0.14 0.52 99 0.14 0.49 1,203
compensation +1 0.10 0.48 99 0.14 0.51 1,204
committee +2 0.03 0.22 98 0.11 0.44 1,204
+3 0.04 0.25 96 0.08 0.39 1,077
–3 0.49 0.50 99 0.51 0.50 1,205
CEOCHAIR =  –2 0.60 0.49 99 0.59 0.49 1,205
Dummy =1 if CEO  –1 0.64 0.48 99 0.64 0.48 1,205
also serves as the    0 0.56 0.50 99 0.62 0.48 1,203
board's chair +1 0.42 0.50 99 0.60 0.49 1,204
+2 0.44 0.50 98 0.59 0.49 1,204
+3 0.42 0.50 96 0.58 0.49 1,077
–3 0.96 0.20 99 0.94 0.23 1,205
EXECDIR_D =  –2 0.96 0.20 99 0.96 0.20 1,205
Dummy =1 if at least –1 0.97 0.17 99 0.96 0.20 1,205
one executve serves   0 0.97 0.17 99 0.95 0.22 1,203
as director +1 0.88 0.33 99 0.94 0.23 1,204
+2 0.88 0.33 98 0.93 0.25 1,204
+3 0.88 0.33 96 0.92 0.27 1,077
–3 0.18 0.39 99 0.14 0.35 1,205
INTERLOCK_D = –2 0.15 0.36 99 0.14 0.35 1,205
Dummy=1 if at least –1 0.13 0.34 99 0.12 0.33 1,205
one executve serves   0 0.09 0.29 99 0.10 0.30 1,203
in the compensation +1 0.05 0.22 99 0.09 0.29 1,204
committee +2 0.02 0.14 98 0.07 0.26 1,204
+3 0.03 0.17 96 0.05 0.23 1,077
Potential  Controls Treated
This table reports the descriptive statistics of five measures of managerial influence over the board for the
treated and the potential controls during the event window from period –3 to period +3, where the benchmark
period 0 refers to the year when a firm falls into financial distress. The measures are: number of executives
that serve as board directors (EXECDIR_N); number of executives that are listed in the compensation
committee interlocks section of the firm's proxy (INTERLOCK_N); CEO-chair dummy that equals one if the
CEO also serves as the firm's board chairperson and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR); executive-director dummy
that equals one if at least one executive serves as director and zero otherwise (EXECDIR_D); and interlock-
dummy (INTERLOCK_D) that equals one if at least one executive serves in thecompensation committee and
zero otherwise.Table 4. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of Financial Distress on Managerial 
              Influence Measures
Panel A. Variables in Levels
Period EXECDIR_N INTERLOCK_N CEOCHAIR EXECDIR_D INTERLOCK_D
–2  0.06    -0.06     0.04     0.00    -0.03   
(0.11)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
–1  0.07    -0.01     0.05     0.02    -0.02   
(0.10)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
  0 0.00    -0.10*   -0.04     0.03*   -0.05*  
(0.11)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
+1 -0.32*** -0.13*** -0.15**  -0.07**  -0.08***
(0.09)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.03)   (0.02)  
+2 -0.27*** -0.16*** -0.13**  -0.06*   -0.09***
(0.09)   (0.03)   (0.06)   (0.03)   (0.02)  
+3 -0.18*   -0.10*** -0.14**  -0.03    -0.06***
(0.09)   (0.03)   (0.06)   (0.03)   (0.02)  
Panel B. Variables in Differences with Respect to their Values in Period –3
Period EXECDIR_N INTERLOCK_N CEOCHAIR EXECDIR_D INTERLOCK_D
–2  0.05    -0.03     0.04    -0.01    -0.02   
(0.07)   (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.02)  
–1  0.00    -0.03     0.04     0.01    -0.02   
(0.09)   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.01)   (0.03)  
  0 -0.04    -0.04    -0.04     0.02    -0.05   
(0.10)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
+1 -0.34*** -0.09    -0.14**  -0.07**  -0.08** 
(0.11)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.03)   (0.04)  
+2 -0.29**  -0.11**  -0.14**  -0.06*   -0.09***
(0.12)   (0.05)   (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
+3 -0.16    -0.02    -0.13*   -0.04    -0.05   
(0.12)   (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
This table reports the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) of financial distress on managerial
influence over the board, using Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias-corrected matching estimator. We measure
managerial influence by five variables: number of executives that serve as board directors (EXECDIR);
number of executives that are listed in the compensation committee interlocks section of the firm's proxy
(INTERLOCK); CEO-chair dummy that equals one if the CEO also serves as the firm's board chairperson
and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR); executive-director dummy that equals one if at least one executive
serves as director and zero otherwise (EXECDIR_D); and interlock-dummy (INTERLOCK_D) that equals
one if at least one executive serves in the compensation committee and zero otherwise. Panel A contains
the estimates using variables in levels, and Panel B the difference-in-difference estimates. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Components of CEO Compensation
Variable Period
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
–3 0.5 0.3 97 0.6 0.3 1,203
–2 0.6 0.3 97 0.7 0.3 1,195
Salary –1 0.6 0.3 97 0.7 0.3 1,203
  0 0.6 0.4 97 0.7 0.4 1,201
+1 0.5 0.3 96 0.7 0.4 1,202
+2 0.6 0.3 96 0.7 0.4 1,201
+3 0.6 0.3 94 0.8 0.4 1,075
–3 0.4 0.5 97 0.5 0.5 1,203
–2 0.4 0.6 97 0.6 0.9 1,195
Bonus –1 0.2 0.6 97 0.6 0.8 1,203
  0 0.1 0.3 97 0.6 0.9 1,201
+1 0.3 0.5 96 0.7 1.0 1,202
+2 0.4 0.5 96 0.8 1.1 1,201
+3 0.5 0.6 94 0.9 1.1 1,075
–3 0.9 0.7 97 1.1 0.8 1,203
TCC = Total Current –2 1.0 0.8 97 1.2 1.1 1,195
Compensation –1 0.9 0.8 97 1.3 1.0 1,203
(Salary + Bonus)   0 0.7 0.6 97 1.3 1.2 1,201
+1 0.9 0.7 96 1.4 1.2 1,202
+2 1.0 0.7 96 1.5 1.3 1,201
+3 1.1 0.8 94 1.6 1.4 1,075
–3 1.9 3.6 97 1.2 2.4 1,203
BLKV = Black- –2 3.0 9.0 97 2.5 8.1 1,191
Scholes Value of –1 4.8 15.4 97 2.3 5.7 1,195
Option Grants   0 1.1 2.5 97 2.6 5.5 1,192
+1 0.9 1.1 95 2.8 10.0 1,193
+2 1.1 1.8 95 2.8 6.6 1,193
+3 1.9 5.0 91 2.6 6.8 1,068
–3 0.2 0.8 97 0.1 0.5 1,203
RSTGRNT =  –2 0.1 0.8 97 0.2 1.0 1,195
Restricted Stock  –1 0.1 0.7 97 0.3 1.0 1,203
Grants Value    0 0.1 0.4 97 0.4 1.5 1,201
+1 0.2 0.6 96 0.4 1.6 1,202
+2 0.2 0.6 96 0.4 1.5 1,201
+3 0.3 1.0 94 0.7 2.3 1,075
–3 3.2 4.9 97 2.7 3.1 1,203
TDC1 = Total Direct –2 4.4 9.8 97 4.3 8.9 1,191
Compensation 1 –1 6.3 17.2 97 4.3 6.7 1,195
(TCC + BLKV +   0 2.4 3.5 97 4.7 7.0 1,192
RSTGRNT + Others) +1 2.3 2.5 95 5.1 11.0 1,193
+2 2.6 3.1 95 5.2 8.2 1,193
+3 3.9 6.4 91 5.6 9.6 1,068
–3 1.1 4.2 96 1.4 5.9 1,190
EXER = Value  –2 5.5 18.5 97 1.8 6.6 1,194
Realized from  –1 2.7 14.7 97 1.8 6.6 1,202
Options Exercises   0 0.1 0.3 97 1.6 5.8 1,197
+1 0.1 0.3 96 1.9 8.4 1,201
+2 0.4 1.5 95 1.8 6.6 1,199
+3 0.3 1.3 93 2.7 10.7 1,072
–3 2.6 4.8 97 2.8 6.4 1,203
TDC2 = Total Direct –2 7.2 19.8 97 3.6 7.8 1,195
Compensation 2 –1 4.3 16.7 97 3.8 7.4 1,203
(TCC + EXER +   0 1.2 1.6 97 3.7 6.8 1,201
RSTGRNT + Others) +1 1.6 1.9 96 4.2 9.4 1,202
+2 2.0 2.7 96 4.3 8.0 1,201
+3 2.2 3.1 94 5.7 13.5 1,075
Potential  Controls Treated
This table summarizes components of CEO compensation for the treated and the potential controls across years inside
the event window from period –3 to period +3, where the benchmark period 0 refers to the year when a firm falls into
financial distress. Total current compensation (TCC) is the sum of Salary and Bonus. Total direct compensation (TDC1) is
the sum of total current compensation, the value of restricted stock grants (RSTGRNT), the Black–Scholes value of stock
option grants (BLKV), and others. The “others” item includes other annual short–term compensation, payouts from
long–term incentive plans, and all other long–term compensation. Besides TDC1, we use another measure of total flow
compensation (TDC2) to a CEO within one fiscal year, which is the sum of TCC, RSTGRNT, value realized from option
exercises (EXER), and others.  All monetary variables are in millions of 2005 dollars.Table 6. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of Financial Distress on CEO Compensation
Panel A. Variables in Levels
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
-2 0.0    -0.1    -0.1     0.1    -0.1    0.0     3.3*    3.2     0.1*  
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.9)   (0.2)   (1.1)   (1.9)   (2.1)   (0.0)  
-1 0.0    -0.3*** -0.4***  1.1    -0.1     0.9     0.5     0.2     0.1*  
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (1.2)   (0.1)   (1.4)   (1.2)   (1.5)   (0.0)  
0 -0.1*   -0.5*** -0.6*** -2.8*** -0.2*   -3.3*** -1.9*** -2.6***  0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.4)   (0.5)   (0.0)  
+1 -0.1**  -0.4*** -0.5*** -4.3*** 0.0    -4.1*** -2.5*** -3.2***  0.1***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.5)   (0.7)   (0.0)  
+2 -0.1*** -0.3*** -0.5*** -2.7*** -0.2    -3.4*** -1.0*** -1.9*** 0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.3)   (0.5)   (0.0)  
+3 -0.1*** -0.2**  -0.4*** -0.8    -0.5**  -1.4*   -2.2*** -2.9***  0.1***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.3)   (0.9)   (0.6)   (0.8)   (0.0)  
Panel B. Variables in Differences with Respect to their Values in Period –3
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
–2  0.0    -0.1*   -0.1*    0.3    -0.2     0.3     2.7*    2.7*    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.2)   (1.0)   (1.6)   (1.6)   (0.0)  
–1 0.0    -0.3*** -0.3***  0.5    -0.2**  0.0     0.9     0.2     0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (1.7)   (0.1)   (1.8)   (1.9)   (1.6)   (0.0)  
  0 -0.1*** -0.5*** -0.5*** -2.4*** -0.3**  -3.2*** -1.6    -2.7*** 0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (1.2)   (1.0)   (0.0)  
+1 -0.1*** -0.4*** -0.5*** -4.9*** -0.1    -5.6*** -2.1*   -3.3***  0.1** 
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.1)   (1.0)   (1.2)   (0.9)   (0.0)  
+2 -0.1*** -0.3*** -0.4*** -2.6*** -0.2*   -3.2*** -0.5    -1.9    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (1.2)   (1.3)   (0.0)  
+3 -0.1*** -0.2**  -0.3*** -0.5    -0.5**  -1.2    -2.5*   -3.9***  0.1** 
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.2)   (0.9)   (1.4)   (1.5)   (0.0)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
All variables are expressed in $ millions, except for OPGRNT
TCC           = Total Current Compensation (Salary + Bonus)
BLKV         =  Black-Scholes Value of Option Grants
RSTGRNT = Restricted Stock Grants Value 
TDC1        = Total Direct Compensation 1 (TCC + BLKV + RSTGRNT + Others)
EXER        = Value Realized from Option Exercises
TDC2        = Total Direct Compensation 2 (TCC + EXER + RSTGRNT + Others)
OPGRNT  = Log(Option Shares Granted / Total Shares Outstanding)
This table reports the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) of financial distress on CEO compensation, using
Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias-corrected matching estimator. All the outcome variables for CEO compensation
components are defined in Table 5, except the last one (OPGRNT) which is defined as the logarithm value of the ratio
of the total number of option shares granted to the total number of firm shares outstanding. The matching estimator
sets the number of matches per treated firm to four and takes the difference with respect to the values of CEO
compensation components in period –3. Panel A contains the estimates using variables in levels, and Panel B the
difference-in-difference estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.Table 7. CEO Turnover Rates 
Turnover
in Period Treated Potential Controls No Turnover Turnover No Turnover Turnover
[–1,+1] 52% 33% 47 51 812 391
[–1,+2] 63% 41% 36 61 711 490
[–1,+3] 69% 48% 29 65 559 514
[–2,+2] 66% 47% 33 64 636 557
[–2,+3] 69% 53% 29 65 496 570
[–3,+3] 69% 56% 29 65 467 599
This table reports the CEO turnover rates for the treated and the potentialcontrols in various sub–windows of
the event window from period –3 to period +3, where the benchmark period 0 refers to the year when a firm
falls into financial distress. Note that the sum of the number of observations in the no–turnover and turnover
groups does not equal the total number of observations because for some firms turnover information is
missing in some years.
Potential Controls (# Obs.) Turnover Rate Treated (# Obs.)Table 8. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of Financial Distress on CEO Turnover Rates
Panel A. Turnover Rates by Multi-Year Windows
Period [–1,+1] [–1,+2] [–1,+3] [–2,+2] [–2,+3] [–3,+3]
ATT  0.19***  0.23***  0.28***  0.20***  0.22***  0.21***
(S.E.) (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)  
Panel B. Turnover Rates Year-by-Year
Period –2 –1 0 +1 +2 +3
ATT -0.01     0.05    -0.02     0.21***  0.06     0.08*  
(S.E.) (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
This table reports the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) of financial distress on CEO compensation, using
Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias-corrected matching estimator. Panel A and Panel B contain results by various multi-
year windows and year-by-year, respectively. Robuststandard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.              CEO Turnover: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Panel A. Firms with No CEO Turnover in [–3,+3]
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
–2  0.0    -0.1    -0.1     0.1    -0.1*   -0.1     0.3     0.7     0.2***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.0)   (1.1)   (0.6)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
–1  0.0    -0.3*** -0.3*** -1.7*** 0.0    -2.1*** -0.4    -1.1**   0.3***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.0)   (0.7)   (0.3)   (0.4)   (0.1)  
  0 0.0*   -0.3*** -0.4*** -1.3**  -0.2**  -1.7**  -1.0    -3.4**   0.6***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (1.7)   (1.7)   (0.1)  
+1 -0.1*** -0.4*** -0.5*** -2.4*** -0.2*   -3.2*** -3.7*** -4.8***  0.1*  
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.8)   (0.9)   (0.1)  
+2 -0.1*** -0.3**  -0.4*** -2.1*** -0.3*   -2.6**  -1.8*   -2.0*   -0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.1)   (1.0)   (1.1)   (1.1)   (0.1)  
+3 -0.1*** -0.3**  -0.3**  -0.8*   -0.2    -0.6     0.1     0.3     0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.2)   (0.8)   (1.6)   (1.8)   (0.1)  
Panel B. Firms with CEO Turnover only in [–1,+1]
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
–2 0.0    -0.1*** -0.1**  -0.8    -0.1    -1.0*   -0.5    -0.8*   0.0   
(0.0)   (0.0)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.4)   (0.5)   (0.1)  
–1  0.0    -0.2**  -0.2     4.8**  0.0     4.7**   0.1     0.1     0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (2.0)   (0.1)   (2.1)   (0.3)   (0.6)   (0.1)  
  0 -0.1**  -0.3*** -0.3*** -1.0**  -0.1    -1.3***  0.1    -0.3     0.3***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.6)   (0.6)   (0.1)  
+1  0.0    -0.1    -0.1    -2.5**  0.0    -3.0*    0.4     0.4    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (1.2)   (0.4)   (1.5)   (0.6)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
+2  0.0    -0.2**  -0.2**  -1.6***  0.1    -1.2**   0.5     0.4     0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.7)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
+3 0.0    -0.1    -0.2    -1.6**   0.0    -2.1*** -1.0    -1.4*   -0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.2)   (0.7)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.7)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
All variables are expressed in $ millions, except for OPGRNT
TCC           = Total Current Compensation (Salary + Bonus)
BLKV         =  Black-Scholes Value of Option Grants
RSTGRNT = Restricted Stock Grants Value 
TDC1        = Total Direct Compensation 1 (TCC + BLKV + RSTGRNT + Others)
EXER        = Value Realized from Option Exercises
TDC2        = Total Direct Compensation 2 (TCC + EXER + RSTGRNT + Others)
OPGRNT  = Log(Option Shares Granted / Total Shares Outstanding)
This table reports the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) of financial distress on CEO compensation for the
no-turnover group (in Panel A) and the turnover group (in Panel B), using Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias-corrected
matching estimator. All the outcome variables for CEO compensation components are defined in Table 3, except the
last one (OPGRNT) which is defined as the logarithm value of the ratio of the total number of option shares granted to
the total number of firm shares outstanding. The matching estimator sets the number of matches per treated firm to
four and takes the difference with respect to the values of CEO compensation components in period –3. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 9. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of Financial Distress on CEO Compensation byTable 10. Descriptive Statistics for the Proportion of Lucky Grants: Before and After SOX
Period
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
–3 0.15 0.35 99 0.14 0.33 1,205 0.11 0.34 99 0.09 0.33 1,195
–2 0.19 0.38 99 0.14 0.34 1,200 0.14 0.37 99 0.10 0.34 1,200
–1 0.09 0.28 99 0.13 0.32 1,200 0.05 0.28 99 0.08 0.31 1,198
  0 0.08 0.27 94 0.11 0.31 1,174 0.03 0.26 94 0.07 0.30 1,174
+1 0.09 0.28 80 0.12 0.31 1,012 0.04 0.29 80 0.08 0.31 1,012
+2 0.10 0.29 62 0.11 0.30 688 0.06 0.27 62 0.07 0.30 688
+3 0.05 0.21 52 0.12 0.32 494 0.01 0.21 52 0.08 0.32 494
+2 0.03 0.17 35 0.05 0.21 521 -0.01 0.17 35 0.01 0.21 521





This table reports the descriptive statistics for the proportion of luck grants for the treated and the potential controls before and after the
adoption of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct (SOX) during the event window from period –3 to period +3, where the benchmark period 0 refers to the
year when a firm falls into financial distress. We follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2010)and define lucky grants as the options that are
given at or below the lowest stock price of the grant month. We calculate the raw measure as the(weighted by grant size) proportion, in the
fiscal year, of unscheduled grants that are lucky grants. The net measure substracts from the raw measure the average proportion of trading
days in which the stock price was at the lowest stock price of the grant month.
Treated Potential  Controls
Raw
Treated Potential  Controls
Net
Proportion of lucky grantsTable 11. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of Financial Distress on the Proportion of Lucky Grants
Panel A. Variables in Levels
Period Raw Net
–2  0.01     0.01   
(0.04)   (0.04)  
–1 -0.06*   -0.06*  
(0.04)   (0.04)  
  0 -0.06*   -0.07** 
(0.03)   (0.03)  
+1 -0.07*   -0.08** 
(0.04)   (0.04)  
+2 -0.04    -0.05   
(0.04)   (0.04)  
+3 -0.03    -0.05   
(0.04)   (0.04)  
Panel B. Variables in Differences with Respect to their Values in Period –3
Period Raw Net
–2  0.06     0.06   
(0.06)   (0.06)  
–1 -0.01    -0.02   
(0.06)   (0.05)  
  0 -0.03    -0.03   
(0.05)   (0.05)  
+1 -0.04    -0.05   
(0.06)   (0.06)  
+2  0.05     0.02   
(0.06)   (0.05)  
+3 -0.05    -0.05   
(0.07)   (0.06)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
Proportion of lucky grants
This table reports the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) of financial distress on the proportion of luck grants
(only for grants before the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX), using Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias-corrected
matching estimator. We follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2010) and define lucky grants as the options that are
given at or below the lowest stock price of the grant month. We calculate the raw measure as the (weighted by grant
size) proportion, in the fiscal year, of unscheduled grants that are lucky grants. The net measure substracts from the
raw measure the average proportion of trading days in which the stock price was at the lowest stock price of the grant
month. Panel A contains the estimates using variables in levels, and Panel B the difference-in-difference estimates.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Proportion of lucky grants